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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - FEDERAL
STANDARDS OF REASONABLENESS APPLIED TO STATE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Petitioner was convicted of illegal possession of marijuana'
on evidence which police officers had seized when, unannounced
and without a warrant, they entered petitioner's apartment by
means of a passkey and arrested him. Relying on Mapp v. Ohio,2
petitioner contended the evidence was the product of an un-
reasonable search and seizure3 and therefore inadmissible. The
California Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, 4 and the
California Supreme Court denied hearing. On certiorari the
United States Supreme Court affirmed. Held, evidence obtained
by a state through search and seizure will be admissible in a
state court if the search and seizure meets basic standards of
reasonableness applicable to both state and federal procedures
as determined by the Supreme Court under the fourth amend-
ment. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).5
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution
establishes a right to be secure against "unreasonable searches
and seizures." Weeks v. United StatesO held evidence seized in
violation of this amendment to be inadmissible, upon timely ob-
jection, in federal criminal prosecutions. 7 This rule of exclusion
originally was applicable only to evidence seized by federal of-
1. CALIF. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11530.
2. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. People v. Ker, 195 Cal. App. 2d 246, 15 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1961).
5. The majority opinion (8-1) dealt only with the law to be applied. On the
merits, there was no majority. Four Justices voted for affirming the decision of
the California court (Clark, Black, Stewart, and White) ; four for reversal (War-
ren, C.J., Goldberg, Douglas, and Brennan); and one Justice (Harlan) con-
curred in the vote for affirmance while echoing a fading dissent from the decision
in Mapp v. Ohio.
6. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
7. Weeks actually held that evidence seized in violation of the fourth amend-
ment must be returned upon timely demand by the defendant, but it has become
the authority for the proposition that the evidence is inadmissible. Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). See generally appendix to Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 155 (1946).
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ficers8 for use in federal courts ;9 by judicial expansion, evidence
unreasonably seized by state officers was excluded from fed-
eral courts,' and that unreasonably seized by federal officers
from state courts." The sole criterion for testing the constitu-
tionality of the seizure was a broad standard of reasonable-
ness12 - purely a matter for judicial determination.
Prior to Wolf v. Colorado8 no case suggested that state
searches and seizures were restricted by the fourth amendment
or its underlying principles through the fourteenth amend-
ment.' 4 Nor was there any suggestion that the federal exclusion-
ary rule had to be applied in state courts. 15 In Wolf, the Su-
preme Court held that the right to privacy, which is at the "core
of the fourth amendment,"' 6 was enforceable against the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.'7
Although the Court did not delineate the bounds of the core of
the fourth amendment, it seems certain from this language that,
though some restrictions were placed on state searches and
seizures, they would not be coextensive with every limitation
imposed by the fourth amendment itself. However, the Court
limited the effectiveness of this holding by further indicatiing
that the exclusionary rule of Weeks was not an essential element
of the fourth amendment, but rather a judicially created rule of
evidence for federal courts not obligatory on the states.' 8 Con-
8. See, e.g., Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949); Byars v. United
States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
9. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
10. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
11. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956). But cf. Wilson v. Schnettler,
365 U.S. 381 (1961). The applicability of the federal rule of exclusion has thus
been broadened from the original requirement of participation by both federal
courts and federal officers to cover situations in which either a federal officer or
a federal court was a party.
12. See generally Comment, Law of Search and Seizure - Federal Standards
of Reasonableness, 28 BROOKLYN L. REV. 302 (1962).
13. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
14. The first eight amendments had consistently been held to have no applica-
tion to the states. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) ; Palko v. Connecti-
cut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
15. At common law, relevant evidence was admissible regardless of the man-
ner in which it was obtained. 8 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2183 (3d ed. 1940).
.16. "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-
which is at the core of the fourth amendment-is .. . implicit in the 'concept
of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the states through the due
process clause." 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
17. No state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
18. 338 U.S. 25, 28-29 (1949). Consequently, in state courts the exclusionary
rule could be accepted or rejected as the lawmakers of the various states chose.
See People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955) (adopted exclusionary
rule in California) ; People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926) (rejected
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sequently, in cases subsequent to Wolf, evidence seized in a man-
ner offensive to the fourth amendment was not inadmissible in
a state court under the Federal Constitution unless it could be
said that a conviction based on such evidence violated the due
process clause.19
The Supreme Court overruled Wolf in Mapp v. Ohio,20 holding
that the fourth amendment was applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment, and that the exclusionary rule was
constitutionally required by both amendments. 21  This pro-
nouncement was explicit in its command - that evidence seized
in violation of the federal constitution was inadmissible in a
state court - but no definitive criteria were established for the
future determination of the constitutionality of a state search
and seizure. It was unclear whether the criteria to be utilized
in determining admissibility in state courts under the fourteenth
amendment were the same as those applicable to federal courts
under the fourth amendment. 22
The Court in the instant case resolved this uncertainty 23 fol-
lowing in the wake of the Mapp decision by holding that the
states were to be governed by the same constitutional standards
of reasonableness that the Supreme Court had evolved for the
federal government.2 4 However, the Court emphatically asserted
exclusionary rule in New York). See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
224-32 (1961) (appendix by the Court).
19. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (evidence obtained by elec-
tronic listening device held not violative of due process) ; Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952) (forcibly extracting contents of defendant's stomach held to
"shock the conscience of the people").
20. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
21. "Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches-state or federal-it was logically and
constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine-an essential part of the
right to privacy- be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right
newly recognized by the Wolf case." Id. at 655-56. In reaching this decision, the
Court conceptually distorted the Wolf holding. Wolf seemed to talk of the right
to privacy which was enforceable against the states through the due process clause
as being, incidentally, the same right which was at the core of the fourth amend-
ment, although not derived therefrom; whereas, Mapp indicated that the right to
privacy in Wolf was the result of Wolf's holding that the fourth amendment was
enforceable against the states.
22. Since the search and seizure in Mapp were clearly unconstitutional under
any standard, no necessity was presented for developing definitive criteria. 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
23. For discussion of some of the problems left by the Mapp decision, see
Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319; Wil-
son, Perspectives of Mapp v. Ohio, 11 KAN. L. REV. 423 (1963) ; Comment,
Aftermath of Mapp v. Ohio-Collateral Problems in the Law of Evidence, 29
BROoKLYN L. REv. 98 (1962).
24. "We specifically held in Mapp that this constitutional prohibition [of con-
victing a man of crime by using evidence seized in violation of the fourth amend-
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that this holding did not force the states to adopt all the intricate
rules governing admissibility of evidence in federal criminal
trials; evidence there may be excluded as a result of the Supreme
Court's exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction over lower fed-
eral courts 25 as well as for constitutional noncompliance.2 6 In
state courts, however, admissibility was restricted only by con-
stitutional proscriptions since the Supreme Court asserted no
such supervisory power over state courts.27
Although the standard of reasonableness to be applied in
state courts is predetermined, it may be difficult to discern
whether a pronouncement by the court in a particular case was
constitutional or supervisory.28 Nevertheless, states are free to
develop their own rules 29 governing search and seizure accord-
ing to the practical demands of local law enforcement provided
they do not transgress the fourth amendment proscription of
unreasonableness ;3o if they fall within the bounds of reasonable-
ness, these rules need not be wholly consistent with federal rules
in analogous situations.8 1
ment] is enforceable against the states through the fourteenth amendment. This
means . .. that the fourth amendment 'is enforceable against them [the states]
by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the federal government,' by
the application of the same constitutional standard prohibiting 'unreasonable
searches and seizures.' " 374 U.S. 23, 27 (1963).
"[T]he reasonableness of a [state] search is ... [to be determined] ... from
the facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of the 'fundamental cri-
teria' laid down by the fourth amendment and in opinions of this court in apply-
ing that amendment." 374 U.S. 23, 28 (1963). (Emphasis added.)
25. The Supreme Court is given statutory power to formulate rules of evidence
and procedure to be applied in federal criminal prosecutions, 62 Stat. 846, 18
U.S.C. § 3771 (1958) ; United States v. Papworth, 156 F. Supp. 842 (N.D. Tex.
1957). Thus evidence may be excluded even though not violative of the Constitu-
tion if the Court in exercise of this supervisory jurisdiction deems such evidence
inadmissible. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
26. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
27. But see Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392 (1963) ; Rea v. United States, 350
U.S. 214 (1956) ; Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
28. Only those constitutional pronouncements will be valid as precedents for
application in state courts. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610
(1961) ; Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) ; Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) ; Bickel, The Supreme Court-1960 Term, 75 fIARV.
L. RFv. 40, 157-58 (1961).
29. The term "rules" as here employed encompasses both statutory law and
judicial decisions. It should be noted that insofar as statutes are concerned, even
under the decision in Wolf, "were a state affirmatively to sanction such [uncon-
stitutional] police incursion into privacy, it would run counter to the guaranty
of the fourteenth amendment." See Salesburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954)
People v. Gonzales, 356 Mich. 247, 97 N.W.2d 16 (1959).
30. The court in the instant case applied the constitutional test of reasonable-
ness to each facet of the action by the police -the existence of probable cause,
the arrest without a warrant, the unannounced entry, and the incidental search.
The court found the fact that police officers had observed petitioner rendezvous
with a known narcotics supplier, and had received information from a reliable
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The protection of citizens against police conduct in disregard
of constitutional rights is now secured by probably the most ef-
fective device available - the removal of the incentive to disre-
gard it.32 Yet, in protecting this right, the practical demands of
effective criminal law enforcement must not be overlooked. In
the final analysis, the difficult though not impossible task of
attempting to achieve a workable balance between conflicting
interests becomes the basic determinant. By permitting states
to design their most effective rules governing search and seizure,
conditioned only upon their compliance with judicially ascer-
tained minimum standards on constitutionality under the
"informer" that petitioner was selling marijuana from his apartment was suffi-
cient to satisfy the requirements of probable cause; consequently, the arrest with-
out a warrant was reasonable. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950)
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
The unannounced entry was the issue which prevented the court from reach-
ing a majority in applying the law to the facts. See note 5 supra. CALIF. PENAL
CODE § 844 permitted a forcible entry for the purpose of effecting a lawful arrest
after a demand for admittance and an announcemnt of authority had been made;
but a judicial exception to the statute allowed entry without such announcement
if announcement would increase the peril or frustrate the arrest. People v. Mad-
dox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6 (1956). The Supreme Court held that the Cali-
fornia rule was reasonable in view of the easily disposable nature of narcotics,
but noted that it had expressly reserved the question of the validity of such an
exception under the similar federal statute. 62 Stat. 820, 18 U.S.C. § 3109
(1958). See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ; Miller v. United
States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958). The four dissenters (Warren, C.J., Douglas, Gold-
berg, and Brennan, JJ.) believed that the unannounced intrusion into petitioner's
privacy by the arresting officers violated the fourth amendment.
The Louisiana statute and judicial exception tracks that of California. LA.
R.S. 15:72 (1950) ; Louisiana ex rel. Naylor v. Walker, 206 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.
La. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 957 (1963) ; State v. Aias, 243 La. 946, 149
So. 2d 400 (1963). It is contemplated that this judicial exception be incorporated
into the revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the Louisiana State Law
Institute. Title V, Arrest § 24 (Expos6 des Motifs No. 2, May 15, 1959).
The examination of the reasonableness of the incidental search concerned two
different parcels of marijuana seized: the first was plainly open to view when
the officers entered the apartment, and the second was uncovered during the
course of a search of petitioner's apartment. As to the first, the Court found
that the fourth amendment had no application since no search was involved.
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) ; United States v. Lee, 274 U.S.
559 (1927). The Court declined to rule on the validity of a search which pre-
ceded the lawful arrest even though such was condoned under California law as
long as probable cause for the arrest existed at the outset. Willson v. Superior
Court of San Diego County, 46 Cal. 2d 291, 294 P.2d 36 (1956). As to the second,
the Court found that the search was reasonable under the fourth amendment. It
accepted as settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest was likewise lawful.
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) ; Marron v. United States, 275
U.S. 192 (1927) ; State v. Cade, 244 La. 534, 153 So. 2d 382 (1963).
31. See People v. Dinan, 11 N.Y.2d 1057, 184 N.E.2d 184 (1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 877 (1963) ; Williams v. Ball, 294 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 990 (1962), holding that the Mapp decision did not prohibit a state's
receiving evidence merely because the seizure and divulgence of the evidence would
violate a federal statute. Would evidence seized in violation of a state statute be
likewise admissible in the courts of that state if the seizure be reasonable though
illegal?
32. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
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fourth amendment, the decisions in Mapp and Ker help to attain
this balance.
S. Patrick Phillips
CRIMINAL LAW - CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DRUG ADDICT STATUTE
Relators had pleaded guilty to a charge of drug addiction
under Louisiana R.S. 40:962A. 1 They later instituted habeas
corpus proceedings attacking this statute on grounds that any
punishment for the status of addiction is cruel and unusual in
violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution since addiction may well be involuntary. The
district judge dismissed the proceedings. On certiorari the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court affirmed. Held, the Louisiana drug addict
statute penalizes the intentional and habitual use of narcotics
leading to addiction - not merely the resultant status or condi-
tion. State ex rel. Blouin v. Walker, 244 La. 699, 154 So. 2d 368
(1963).
It is now well settled that regulation of narcotics and drugs
is a valid exercise of a state's police power.2 The very serious
nature of the biological and psychological consequences, the close
relationship of crime and addiction, and the alarming increase
of addiction since World War II have prompted the states to
provide severe penalties to curb the narcotics problem.3 Such
statutes should be construed in light of their underlying purpose
to protect public health from the insidious consequences of the
unauthorized use of these drugs.4
In Robinson v. State of California5 the United States Su-
preme Court held unconstitutional a California law making nar-
cotic addiction a criminal offense with a mandatory imprison-
1. LA. R.S. 40:962A (1950) : "It is unlawful for any person to manufacture,
possess, have under his control, sell, give, deliver, transport, prescribe, administer,
dispense, or compound any narcotic drug, except as provided in this Sub-part,
or to be or to become an addict as defined in R.S. 40:961." (Emphasis added.)
2. Minnesota ex rel. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41 (1921) ; 17A AM.
Jun. Drugs and Druggists § 9 (1957). Accord, State v. Martin, 192 La. 704, 189
So. 109 (1939) ; State v. Kumpfert, 115 La. 950, 40 So. 365 (1905) ; Allopathic
State Board of Medical Examiners v. Fowler, 50 La. Ann. 1358, 24 So. 809
(1898). See also State v. Thomas, 224 La. 431, 69 So. 2d 738 (1954).
3. See Drug Addiction: Crime or Disease?, 1961 A.B.A.-A.M.A. JOINT COM-
MITTEE ON NARcoTIC DRuGs REP.
4. Territory v. Hu Seong, 20 Hawaii 669 (1911).
5. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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